DR. TARA E. TRASK
Senior Lecturer
Undergraduate Studies Coordinator
Dept. of Political Science
Clemson University
ttrask@clemson.edu
ABOUT ME
I am a Senior Lecturer and the Undergraduate Studies Coordinator in the Dept. of Political Science at Clemson University.
My research examines the intersection of international human rights regimes and domestic laws and practice of those rights - particularly focused on the area of Child-Early-Forced-Marriage (CEFM).
My courses are designed to build students' knowledge and skills in political science. Specifically, I aim to equip them to ask and answer important questions and speak with intellectual confidence and depth of understanding about a variety of topics - for students of all skill levels, including high school, first-year student, upperclassmen, majors, and non-majors.
I have taught political science courses at Clemson University, the University of Georgia, Coastal Pines Technical College, and Duke's former Talent Identification Program.
I am also Mental Health First Aid Certified
Child Early Forced Marriage as Human Rights Abuse in International and Domestic Spheres
DISSERTATION
Child, early, and forced marriages (CEFM) are fundamental violations of human rights that disproportionately affect girls, with severe consequences for their health, education, and economic opportunities. As a single human rights abuse and as a key link in combating other human rights issues, CEFM has been addressed by various international instruments and domestic laws with mixed effects. This dissertation explores the international CEFM regime and how the international norms enter domestic legal systems and potentially alter practices. I argue that decoupling between governments’ commitment and practice has clouded advocates’ attempts to reduce CEFM rates. I build on previous scholarship on human rights treaty ratification, international norm integration, and child rights, among others. This dissertation is the first cross-national, time-series analysis to explore issues related to CEFM. To evaluate my expectations, I use two original datasets. The first includes states’ ratification of international treaties with CEFM provisions from 1960 to 2018. The second records when states updated their minimum marriage age laws to meet international standards from 1960 to 2018. I test my arguments using quantitative models including survival analysis and regression. Results support my expectations on the decoupling between governments’ commitment and practice, especially for developing states. However, the role of domestic interest groups and international pressures may provide opportunities for advocates to leverage for change.
RESEARCH
Working papers
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD: NATIONAL LAWS & CHILD-EARLY FORCED MARRIAGE TREATY COMPLIANCE
Completed as Dissertation Chapter. Editing with Intent to Publish.
Child, early, and forced marriages (CEFM) are fundamental violations of human rights that disproportionately affect girls, with severe consequences for their health, education, and economic opportunities. As a single human rights abuse and as a key link in combating other human rights issues, CEFM has been addressed by over a dozen human rights treaties, with various requirements from setting a minimum age to establishing marriage registries. But when do states comply with these treaties by changing their national laws? As a slow-changing practice largely left to local or regional jurisdictions, national governments may have incentives to ratify treaties and pass marriage laws with no authority or desire to enforce those changes in practicality. Thus, states may gain international benefits with minimal cost. This paper argues a state’s capability – such as its administrative capacity and legal structures – as well as its resolve – such as its existing status of women’s rights – are likely to effect whether it complies with such treaties. I create a new dataset of national marriage laws based on the general attributes of CEFM provisions: age of marriage, provision of consent, birth registration, and marriage registration. I test my argument using quantitative models.
DO YOU TAKE THIS TREATY?: TREATY RATIFICATION & CHILD-EARLY-FORCED-MARRIAGE
Completed as Dissertation Chapter. Editing with Intent to Publish.
Child, early, and forced marriages (CEFM) are fundamental violations of human rights that disproportionately affect girls, with severe consequences for their health, education, and economic opportunities. As a single human rights abuse and as a key link in combating other human rights issues, CEFM has been addressed by various human rights treaties, from the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, to a specific UN Convention. Some require only for states to set a minimum age of marriage while others require legislation, birth and/or marriage registries, and even institutions to confirm consent. So when do states decide to ratify a human rights treaty that includes such CEFM provisions?
This paper argues that there are two components to a state’s cost-analysis for treaty ratification: the treaty characteristics and the state’s capability to comply. It builds on previous work on human rights treaty ratification, state capacity, and domestic institutions by focusing on a particular human rights abuse within a network of human rights treaties. CEFM provides particular insight into state decision-making around cultural practices, the effect of legal jurisdictions on the ability to comply, and the role of administrative institutions in enforcement. As a slow-changing practice largely left to local or regional jurisdictions, it provides a unique insight into the ability and willingness of national governments to ratify provisions they may not have the ability to comply with.
I create a new dataset with international, regional, broader human rights, or issue-specific treaties based on their level of legalization for the major components of CEFM provision: age of marriage, provision of consent, birth registration, and marriage registration. Along with other quantitative data on states’ statistical capacity, I test my argument using quantitative models.
Scheduled to be presented at APSA Annual Meeting 2019, Washington D.C.
BETWEEN TWO RIVERS: FOREIGN AID BYPASSING THE STATE IN PURSUIT OF FOOD SECURITY
Co-authored with Sarah G. Hunter
The ability of foreign aid to lead to positive development outcomes is predicated on the idea that these resources are being sent to those persons or organizations that can best use those resources in the places that most need them. As strategic actors, both nongovernmental and governmental agents have their strengths and weaknesses in how well they are able to turn resources into desirable outcomes. Aid donors strategically bypass these government actors in favor of NGOs depending on the recipient governments’ quality of governance – where lower quality of governance signals a higher risk of aid capture (Dietrich 2013). Consequently, this paper asks the question – under what conditions do donors decide to bypass the recipient states’ government when choosing to send food aid? Is food aid as responsive to governance concerns as broader aid flows?
Presented at ISA Annual Meeting 2019, Toronto
STICKY BUSINESS OF FOOD AID BYPASS
Co-authored with Sarah G. Hunter
When a catastrophe strikes a state, the international community responds with money, resources, and more development programs. Recently, donors have not been limited to giving humanitarian assistance only to the state: international nongovernmental organizations (INGO) have also become powerful actors in the relief sector. States with poor governance or poor human rights practices have seen an increasing proportion of aid given to INGOs rather than directly to the recipient state. Food aid is no different: donor states tend to bypass states with poor ability to maintain or regulate food security. This leads to another question: how long after a state achieves an improvement on food security will donors continue to bypass the state? In this paper, we argue that the reasons behind the decision to initially bypass the recipient state strongly inform the decision to continue bypassing. In terms of food aid, recipient states bypassed for lack of capacity (especially food production) are more likely to start receiving direct aid again after improvements in food security. On the other hand, states bypassed for lack of willingness to maintain food security will continue to be bypassed longer. We test our arguments using event history models.
Presented at ISA Annual Meeting 2018, San Francisco
LABOR RIGHTS AND THE DEVELOPED WORLD: CAPITALISM, LAW, AND PRACTICE
Co-authored with Shelby Hall
“Race to the Bottom” and “Climb to the Top” arguments have been applied to how economic liberalization may drive developing states’ experiences with labor rights. These explanations have largely ignored how labor rights arose in the developed world, where legal rights have been assumed synonymous with labor practices. Beginning with the Varieties of Capitalism (VOC) literature, we argue that developed states’ experienced the path to labor rights and practices differently depending on whether they were a Coordinated Market Economy (CME) or Liberal Markey Economy (LME). We test evaluate our argument using a new dataset that includes legal rights and practices.
